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There has been extensive discussion of testimonial epistemic injus-
tice, the phenomenon whereby a speaker’s testimony is rejected due
to prejudice regarding who they are. But people also have their tes-
timony rejected or preempted due to prejudice regarding what they
communicate. Here, the injustice is content-focused. We describe
several cases of content-focused injustice, and we theoretically in-
terrogate those cases by building up a general framework through
which to understand them as a genuine form of epistemic injustice
that stands in intertwined relationships to other forms of epistemic
injustice.
1 Introduction
HIV posed an enormous threat to public health in the United States in the
1980’s and early 1990’s, taking tens of thousands of lives. Yet research into
its treatment proceeded at a glacially slow pace, and not by accident. The
Reagan Administration repeatedly undercut efforts to combat HIV, rejecting
clear testimony from numerous public health experts that HIV was an alarming
threat that required immediate action. It even flatly refused to approve funding
Congress eventually allocated for HIV research, brushing off the disease as if “it
was measles and it would go away.”1 Commenting on the matter, Don Francis
(an official at the Center for Disease Control) testified to Congress in 1987 that
Much of the HIV/AIDS epidemic was and continues to be pre-
ventable. But because of active obstruction of logical policy, active
1Rimmerman (2001: 88). See also Faderman (2015). It took acts of civil disobedience and
activism for this research to receive adequate attention and funding.
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resistance to essential funding, and active interference with scientif-
ically designed programs, the executive branch of this country has
caused untold hardship, misery, and expense to the American pub-
lic.2
While one might wonder why anyone would reject expert testimony about
a quickly spreading disease, Reagan’s officials did not hide their motivations.
Referring to HIV as “the gay disease”, they overtly construed support for pre-
vention research as support for the gay community.3 This construal was the
reason, or at least one of the reasons, why they rejected expert testimony that
HIV research was needed in order to protect public health.
By rejecting this testimony, officials in Reagan’s administration committed
an epistemic injustice. (More on this in §3 and §4.) But this rejection does not
fall under either of the two categories of epistemic injustice most commonly dis-
cussed: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In what has become
the canonical (though challenged) explication of these notions, Miranda Fricker
writes that “Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice [regarding a speaker’s
identity] causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s
word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective
interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to
making sense of their social experiences.”4 For example, the first occurs when a
police officer refuses to believe someone because they are black, and the second
occurs when someone experiences sexual harassment but cannot articulate this
experience because they lack a concept of sexual harassment.
The Reagan administration’s rejection of expert HIV-related testimony be-
longs in neither of these categories. The speakers in question were, by and
2Rimmerman (2001: 89).
3Green (2011). Green notes that during a congressional hearing on HIV, “one Republican,
Rep. Bill Dannemeyer of California, delivered a speech on the House floor titled ‘What
Homosexuals Do’ and read graphic descriptions of sexual acts into the Congressional Record.”
4Fricker (2007: 1).
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large, heterosexual white men in government and the sciences, making it ex-
tremely unlikely that testimonial injustice (in Fricker’s sense) was occurring.
And these speakers did not lack any concept critical to expressing their testi-
mony, meaning that no hermeneutical injustice was occurring. We think that
the administration’s rejection of expert testimony is best understood as what
we will call content-focused injustice or ‘CFI’: epistemic injustice focused
not on the identity of a given speaker, but rather on the things that speaker
communicates.
That, of course, is a preliminary and unspecific way to put it. We’ll attempt
to add more detail, and thus illuminate the phenomenon at hand. The first step
will be to describe several actual cases of the phenomenon in addition to the HIV
case. We’ll then theorize about these cases by offering up a general model that
taxonomizes them (§2). With that much theorizing on the table, we’ll explain
why CFI is an epistemic injustice (§3), and we’ll explore its relationships to
other forms of epistemic injustice (§4).
A few clarifying remarks before diving into the details. First, we are by no
means the first to discuss the phenomenon we call ‘CFI’: other scholars, and es-
pecially black feminist and indigenous scholars, have discussed many instances
of CFI (although not under that label), as well as its effects.5 What we hope
to bring to these discussions is a general framework within which to situate
these many instantiations of CFI. Second, our framework includes a number of
sufficient conditions for CFI, all of which feature prejudice and, in particular,
prejudice against structurally oppressed groups – that is, groups that are “sys-
tematically and unfairly disadvantaged within a social structure.”6 Prejudice
against non-oppressed groups certainly exists. Perhaps it can even yield cases of
a non-systematic sort of CFI. But such cases would not fall under the sufficient
5See, e.g., The Combahee River Collective (1979), Rich (1980), Lugones (1987, 2006), and
Hill Collins (1991).
6Haslanger (2004: 98).
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conditions we offer. This is because we think it is centrally important to high-
light cases that exist within and perpetuate contexts of oppression. This brings
us to our third and final clarifying remark: our comments throughout apply
only to the central cases of CFI, the cases that–we will argue–collectively per-
petuate contexts of oppression by controlling and preempting knowledge about
oppressed groups.
2 Varieties of content-focused injustice
This section delineates, illustrates, and offers up sufficient conditions for some
of CFI’s common manifestations.7
2.1 Reactive content-focused injustice
We start with Reactive CFI, which features peoples’ reactions to assertions.
Sometimes this phenomenon occurs when a hearer is prejudiced against a group
(or member of a group) an assertion is about. Other times, it occurs when a
hearer is prejudiced against a group (or member of a group) they associate with
things an assertion is about. An example of the first sort – where the prejudice
attaches to a group (or member of a group) an assertion is about – is found in
Oscar Wilde’s classic The Picture of Dorian Gray. In the book, Dorian Gray
becomes smitten with a young actress. Speaking about her to his friend, Lord
Harry Wotton, the following exchange occurs:
“Who are you in love with?” asked Lord Henry...
“Her name is Sibyl Vane.”
“Never heard of her.”
7For related work developed contemporaneously with but independently of ours, see Davis
(MS), which builds a concept of “Content-based testimonial injustice” and applies it to pro-
fessional philosophy. While Davis’ content-based testimonial injustice is similar to CFI, there
are important differences. Our papers are usefully read in tandem.
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“No one has. People will some day, however. She is a genius.”
“My dear boy, no woman is a genius. Women are a decorative sex.
They never have anything to say, but they say it charmingly. Women
represent the triumph of matter over mind.”8
Here, Dorian attempts to communicate some information about Sibyl: she
is a genius. Henry prejudicially rejects Dorian’s assertion. However – and this
distinguishes the case from the sorts of cases Fricker and others have focused
on in their discussions of testimonial injustice – he does not reject it because
of any prejudice against the speaker, Dorian. Rather, he rejects it because
because of his prejudice involving its content, and more exactly because of his
prejudice against a group that Sibyl belongs to – namely, women.9 Because
Henry prejudicially believes women to be incapable of being geniuses, he rejects
Dorian’s (a man’s) assertion that a woman is a genius.
This form of injustice is not restricted to the fictional worlds of literature.
Consider the conservative evangelical response to Alfred Kinsey’s pathbreaking
1953 book Sexual Behavior in the Human Female. This book revealed that fifty
percent of American females reported having sexual intercourse before marriage;
within this group, 69% of those who were still unmarried reported having no
regret about their premarital experiences, and 77% of those who were married
reported the same.10 Conservative religious figures reacted to this book far more
ferociously than they had reacted to Kinsey’s earlier book, Sexual Behavior
and the Human Male, which had revealed similar data about American males.
(Shocking, we know.) In an interpretation we find plausible, historian Marie
Griffith writes that
[Kinsey’s book had] a graphic focus on the sexual activity of women
8Wilde (1908: 65).
9Though the ‘decorative’ description reveals that, more specifically, the group in question
is white women.
10Griffith (2008: 365).
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and girls....the male volume had already proclaimed that men expe-
rienced about half their orgasms in situations that most Americans
reputedly still reckoned sinful, unlawful, or otherwise objectionable.
But when Kinsey claimed to find much the same picture for women,
his work threatened to upend ... gendered sexual roles and expec-
tations ... In short, gender figured deeply in the explosive reactions
among religious conservatives to Kinsey’s publications.11
Such reactions came from (among others) the popular evangelist Billy Gra-
ham, who rejected the claim that ‘seven out of ten women who had premarital
affairs had no regrets’. Calling this claim ‘lopsided and unscientific’, he assured
his listeners that it did not accurately describe the ‘born-again Christian women
of this country’ who ‘thank God...still know how to blush’.12
Why did Graham reject Kinsey’s claims? One likely answer is that he har-
bored prejudicial attitudes about women, attitudes construing women as (among
other things) sexually passive and so not prone to do the things Kinsey de-
scribed. Notice, though, that Kinsey was not a member of the group at which
the operative prejudices were directed; he was not a woman. If this explana-
tion is correct, it remains true that Kinsey’s testimony was not rejected due
to prejudice about the group he was a member of. Rather, it was rejected
due to prejudice about the group he was talking about. His treatment therefore
amounts to a real-life case of Reactive CFI, a case where the operative prejudice
was against a group an assertion was about.
For a case where the operative prejudice was against a group the hearers
associated with things the assertion was about, recall the HIV case. In that
case, officials in Reagan’s administration rejected speakers’ testimony that HIV
threatened public health. In this case, the testimony was not about the gay com-
11Griffith (2008: 365).
12Griffith (2008: 366).
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munity, or even about particular gay persons; it was about a quickly spreading
disease. Nonetheless, the association between this disease and the gay commu-
nity triggered officials’ anti-gay prejudice, resulting in their rejection of expert
testimony.
These cases of Reactive CFI suggest the following sufficient condition:
A hearer (H) has committed a reactive content-focused injustice if H
rejects a speaker’s assertion at least in part because of H’s prejudice
involving the assertion’s content.
Notice that this condition only concerns rejections of assertions. This is
purely for simplicity. We think (but won’t argue here) that reactive CFI also
occurs in cases of accepting or ignoring assertions. It also occurs in cases of re-
acting to speech acts other than assertions (questions for instance), and to items
other than speech acts (concepts or physical evidence or as-yet-unasserted theo-
ries for instance).13 As for what ‘assertions’ are, we think of them as particular
(token) speech acts. The contents of assertions are the things people communi-
cate by making those assertions (propositions).14
Also notice that the foregoing condition leaves the word ‘involving’ open-
ended. This is intentional. There are at least two importantly different ways
that prejudice can ‘involve’ the contents of assertions. On the one hand, it can
be directed at a group (or a member of a group) the assertion is about, as it
was in the Kinsey case. On the other hand, it can be directed at a group (or
member of a group) the hearer associates with the things the assertion is about,
as it was in the HIV case.
13See Wanderer (2012) on ignoring, Hookway (2010) on questions, Mills (2007) on racist
concepts, and Anderson (2017: section 5) on prejudicial reactions to physical evidence.
14As we use these terms, the contents of assertions are not what we explicitly say by making
those assertions. Rather, they are what we communicate by making those assertions. Not
everything communicated is explicitly said.
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2.2 Preemptive content-focused injustice
Whereas Reactive CFI features reactions to assertions, Preemptive CFI fea-
tures preemptions of assertions, as well as other ways of transmitting knowledge
about oppressed groups. These preemptions occur when an agent prevents ei-
ther themself or others from encountering this knowledge, and does so on the
basis of prejudice. Let’s again begin with concrete examples.
One case of Preemptive CFI occurred when, in the 1950’s at Oxford, the
influential historian Keith Thomas offered a series of lectures on women’s history.
Students voted against these lectures with their feet: only about a half dozen
showed up to them, whereas several hundred showed up to the lectures Thomas
offered shortly afterwards on Aristotle, Hobbes, and Rousseau.15 We take it
as a working hypothesis that, in at least some cases, these students declined
to attend Thomas’ lectures at least partly because they prejudicially believed
that women’s history was unimportant. Those students committed an act of
preemptive CFI – an act through which they prejudicially prevented themselves
from encountering knowledge about an oppressed group.
In other cases agents preempt, not their own, but a third party’s exposure to
knowledge about an oppressed group. This preemption can be broad, aimed to
prevent the party’s exposure in every or nearly every context, or may be narrow,
aimed to prevent a party’s exposure within a particular context or a small range
of contexts. For a broad case consider first the Russian ‘gay propaganda’ law,
which criminalizes
the distribution of information aimed at forming non-traditional sex-
ual orientations, the attraction of non-traditional sexual relations,
distorted conceptions of the social equality of traditional and non-
traditional sexual relations among minors, or imposing information
15Thomas (1993), and personal communication.
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on non-traditional sexual relations which evoke interest in these
kinds of relations... [including actions] which are committed with
the employment of the media and/or information and telecommuni-
cations networks (including Internet sites).... [or] by foreign citizens
or stateless persons.16
In effect, this law is aimed to prevent minors from acquiring any knowledge
about LGBTQ persons and relationships in any context. For a contrasting
narrower case, consider a South Carolina law regarding sexual health education
classes in public schools:
The program of instruction provided for in this section may not
include a discussion of alternate sexual lifestyles from heterosexual
relationships including, but not limited to, homosexual relationships
except in the context of instruction concerning sexually transmitted
diseases.17
Both laws aim to prevent minors from acquiring knowledge about LGBTQ
persons and relationships. But while the Russian law effectively applies in all
contexts, the South Carolina law applies only in the context of the sexual health
education classroom.
Preemptive CFI, like Reactive CFI, can feature prejudice that involves con-
tent in two importantly different ways. As before, the prejudice at work can
be directed at the groups (or group members) the relevant claims are about,
or at the groups (or group members) the hearer associates with the things the
claims are about. While the cases of Keith Thomas and Russia and South Car-
olina provide examples the former sort, the HIV case provides an example of
the latter sort. In that case, not only did the Reagan’s administration com-
16Russian Federal Law #135-FZ. In Decker & Wilson (2013).
17S.C. Stat. 59-32-30(5).
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mit Reactive CFI by rejecting scientists’ testimony regarding AIDS, they also
committed Preemptive CFI. By refusing to direct funding to this research, they
effectively prevented persons such as scientists in government-funded labs and
public health workers from exposure to new information about AIDS. Moreover,
they did this not only because this information was in part about gay persons,
but also because information about AIDS was, to them, associated with gay
persons. This cases shows that Preemptive and Reactive CFI are not mutually
exclusive: they can occur simultaneously.
These cases of Preemptive CFI suggest the following sufficient condition:
A hearer (H) has committed a preemptive content-focused injustice if
H prevents themself or others from encountering a speaker’s assertion
(in a context) at least in part because of H’s prejudice involving the
assertion’s content.18,19
3 What makes CFI an epistemic injustice?
3.1 CFI and malignant misrecognition
Return to our HIV case, where officials rejected scientists’ testimony on the basis
of anti-gay prejudice involving its content. There is room to doubt whether this
case features epistemic injustice. After all, the people whose assertions are
rejected are not themselves targets of prejudice, and the people who are targets
of prejudice (gay men) may not seem to be victims of any particularly epistemic
18Preemptive CFI is similar to what Pohlhaus (2012) calls ‘willful hermeneutical ignorance’.
However, there are multiple important differences. For one, willful hermeneutical ignorance, on
Pohlhaus’s account, is always self-directed, while preemptive CFI includes other-directed cases.
In addition, Pohlhaus focuses on cases in which agents refuse to use a marginalized group’s
epistemic resources, rendering that group’s assertions unintelligible or twisted in meaning.
This is not a feature of preemptive CFI, which often occurs while the hearer knows full well
what the speaker is trying to communicate.
19We take it that ‘white ignorance’ (see e.g. Mills (2007) and Medina (2012)) often features
preemptive CFI. See section 3.2.
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harms. Rather, one might think, they only are harmed in more obvious, socio-
political ways as a result of lawmakers’ rejection of scientific testimony. Where,
then, is the epistemic injustice?
The normative terrain here is complex. We think that close examination of
it reveals ways in which, when CFI occurs, the targets of prejudice are targets
of epistemic harms. Before bringing those harms out, we should note that much
of the literature on epistemic injustice has focused on what might be called
‘deflationary’ and ‘hermeneutical’ epistemic injustices. Deflationary epistemic
injustices occur when a speaker’s credibility is deflated due to their social iden-
tity or identities, paradigmatically in cases of testimonial injustice. Hermeneu-
tical epistemic injustices, by contrast, occur when someone is – to quote Fricker
– put at an “unfair disadvantage” with respect to understanding their social
experience.20
No doubt, acts of CFI often cause or sustain other things that constitute
deflationary or hermeneutical injustices. These causal relationships are unde-
niably important (see §4). But we do not think acts of CFI always cause or
sustain those kinds of injustices. Moreover, we think CFI is an epistemic injus-
tice independently of whether it causes or sustains deflationary or hermeneutical
injustices. In thinking this, we diverge from Jose´ Medina (2018), who locates
the main injustice of cases that we would consider cases of CFI in their causal
contributions to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.21 On our view, CFI
is an epistemic injustice even when it doesn’t cause or sustain deflationary or
hermeneutical injustices. This is because systemic rejection and preemption of
knowledge about marginalized groups is a form of malignant misrecognition that
is itself a form of epistemic injustice.22
20Of course, many authors have complicated Fricker’s picture of hermeneutical injustice,
e.g. Pohlhaus (2012) and Medina (2012).
21Medina (2018: 2): “[C]ertain dysfunctional patterns of recognition result in pathologies
of public discourse that undermine the intelligibility and credibility of marginalized groups.”
22For other approaches that connect epistemic injustice to misrecognition, see Special Issue
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We take the notion of misrecognition from political philosophy, where it has
been discussed in a variety of ways. According to one important tradition,
recognition is a positive acknowledgement of one’s status as free and equal; and
misrecognition – that is, the lack this acknowledgement – is bad due to its psy-
chological effects. These effects consist in distorted and devalued relationships
to oneself via which, in some cases, one does not even recognize one’s own status
as a free and equal person. This way of thinking about misrecognition has been
used, for instance, to describe psychological harms suffered by slaves and by
indigenous persons oppressed under colonial rule.23
These psychological harms are no doubt real and important, sometimes are
properly “epistemic”, and sometimes are the result of CFI. However, we locate
the key epistemic-injustice-relevant feature of misrecognition a step back, in
the distribution and accessibility of relevant, accurate, and sufficient knowledge
about social groups and their members. Misrecognition, we think, occurs when
knowledge or belief about groups is systematically and unfairly distorted, re-
jected, or unavailable. This understanding of misrecognition is broad: in this
broad sense, all or nearly all social groups – including dominant groups – face
some degree of misrecognition. In some cases, in fact, misrecognition of domi-
nant groups functions to sustain their social power, as in the case of systematic
distortion, rejection, or unavailability regarding the history of white supremacy
– a misrecognition that perpetuates current forms of white supremacy.
Misrecognition of a group, then, is not enough to show that the group in
question suffers an epistemic injustice. But with this broad understanding of
misrecognition in place, we follow Nancy Fraser in holding that social justice
Vol 4 No 4 (2018) of Feminist Philosophy Quarterly: “Epistemic Injustice and Recognition
Theory” (eds Paul Giladi and Nicola McMillan), and the references therein.
23Helpful work on this tradition includes Taylor (1994), which traces it from contemporary
identity politics back through Fanon to Hegel and in some ways Rousseau; Cudd (2006), which
argues that it does not yield an adequate theory of oppression; and Congdon (2018), which
focuses on its current standard-bearer Axel Honneth.
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requires that people and groups have fair access to “parity of participation”, or
conditions in which they interact as peers on equal footing.24 Misrecognition,
she argues, can undermine this access. It happens to an individual or group
when “institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation unjustly deny
them... equal respect and/or equal opportunity for achieving social esteem.”25
Call misrecognition that has these effects malignant misrecognition. Patterns
of malignant misrecognition feature numerous phenomena ranging from laws
against gay marriage to demeaning stereotypical depictions of a racial group in
the media. Importantly for our purposes, though, the core feature of malignant
misrecognition is that it either burdens persons with “excessive ascribed ‘differ-
ence’ from others” or it unfairly fails to “acknowledge their distinctiveness.”26
That is, malignant misrecognition functions to unfairly diminish a group’s ac-
cess to participatory parity through either error characterizing them as more
different from others than they really are, or ignorance rendering their distinc-
tive features not sufficiently characterized (erroneously or otherwise). Malignant
misrecognition, then, unfairly diminishes access to participatory parity. It un-
fairly reduces the access of oppressed groups to interact with others as peers on
equal footing. This reduced access is unjust.
We’ll now argue that CFI generates malignant misrecognition – or, more
carefully, that whenever our sufficient conditions for CFI are met there is also
malignant misrecognition. We begin this argument with an illustration, drawn
from Marilyn Frye. Imagine a bird in a cage. Each wire of the cage, in and of
itself, is only a minor inconvenience to the bird; it blocks only one very particular
route of escape. And yet, taken together, the wires form a system the parts of
24Fraser’s works on misrecognition diverge from the tradition (whose members are Honneth
and others) discussed above. While those works have been well and widely received, no one
(that we know of) has yet connected them to epistemic injustice. We think that this is an
oversight, and that remedying it illuminates why CFI is an epistemic injustice. We take on
many of Fraser’s views here, but not all of them; see the footnotes below.
25Fraser (1998: 36).
26Fraser (1998: 54-55).
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which jointly limit the bird in ways that are profound, pervasive, and resilient.
The bird’s limitations are profound: they diminish its well-being in ways not
trivial but enormously important. They also are pervasive: they apply, not in
a way that is restricted to just a few parts of its life (however important those
parts might be), but instead across a wide range of activities from its eating to
its sleeping to its attempts to find other birds in the wild. And they are resilient:
they are apt to endure attempts at resistance, because the elements of the cage
work to reinforce one another. If you try to push a vertical wire out of place, the
horizontal wires (to which it is welded) resist the force you apply. At the same
time, those resistant horizontal wires get their own reinforcement from each of
the vertical wires, welded as they are to each of the horizontals. Many small
barriers, each of them but a minor inconvenience on its own, mutually reinforce
one another. The net result is a profound, pervasive, and resilient system of
barriers:
As the cageness of the bird cage is a macroscopic phenomenon, the
oppressiveness of the situations in which women live our various and
different lives is a macroscopic phenomenon. Neither can be seen
from a microscopic perspective. But when you look macroscopically
you can see it – a network of forces and barriers which are systemat-
ically related and which conspire to the immobilization, reduction,
and molding of women and the lives we live... if one wants to deter-
mine whether a particular suffering, harm, or limitation is part of
someone’s being oppressed, one has to look at it in context in order
to tell whether it is an element in an oppressive structure: one has
to see if it is part of an enclosing structure of forces and barriers
which tends to the immobilization and reduction of a group or cate-
gory of people. One has to look at how the barrier or force fits with
14
others...27
With Frye’s cage analogy in mind, return to our examples of CFI, for in-
stance the examples involving gender and sexual minority groups: the rejection
of HIV testimony, the Russian anti-gay propaganda law and the South Carolina
sex-education law, and the rejection of Kinsey’s work on sex (which, we should
add, revealed not only widespread non-passive heterosexual activity by women,
but also widespread queer activity). Each of these acts, taken in isolation, is
worrisome. But to grasp their injustice, we must view them macroscopically as
a whole. Together (along with many other things), they result in widespread
ignorance and error about queer and trans persons. This widespread ignorance
and error is not morally inert. Rather, it unfairly diminishes the participatory
parity of the queer and trans persons who are its target. For instance, the med-
ical community has been, and continues to be, less knowledgeable about the
lives and needs of trans persons than about the lives and needs of non-trans
persons. As a result the medical community has treated and continues to treat
trans persons using pathologizing, inaccurate understandings of them.28 Simi-
lar treatment occurs in many other contexts as well. To point out just one of
them, consider the context of incarceration.29 Due to widespread error and igno-
rance about trans persons, trans women and men frequently face mistreatment
when incarcerated, mistreatment ranging from being placed in incorrect facili-
ties, to not having access to necessary medical care, to constant misgendering
and harassment. The misinformation and ignorances at work here traces back
to (among other things) many acts of CFI working in tandem – acts frequently
motivated by anti-trans and anti-queer prejudices.
The lesson is that, much like particular wires jointly limit the bird by en-
27Frye (1983: 10-11).
28See Heyes and Latham (2018).
29Spade (2015).
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closing it in a small space, particular acts of CFI jointly limit oppressed people
by collectively creating misrecognition through which their participatory parity
is unfairly diminished – i.e., by collectively creating malignant misrecognition.
And the point surely generalizes to other cases of CFI as well, for instance cases
involving women or racial minorities. Particular acts of CFI amount to injus-
tices, not in virtue of what they cause individually, but rather in virtue of their
networked relationships to other acts taken macroscopically as a whole. Work-
ing in concert, the relevant acts unfairly diminish oppressed groups’ access to
participatory parity. That is why they are injustices.
But why are these injustices epistemic, and not merely social or political?
The answer is: because they are knowledge-directed; and they are knowledge-
directed because to be subjected to CFI is to have knowledge involving oneself
(or one’s social group) systematically preempted or erased or distorted. It is, in
short, to be harmed as a thing known. When this variety of harm happens, one
is harmed in one’s capacity as an object of knowledge. And one can be harmed
as an object of knowledge because, in order to be treated justly, one must not
be unfairly blocked off from being known about in ways that are required for one
to be treated equally as compared to one’s peers. It is because CFI features this
sort of harm, that it amounts to an epistemic injustice and not merely a social
or political one.30
30Here, so far as we know, our view diverges from other extant attempts to explicitly con-
nect epistemic injustice and misrecognition, which take epistemic injustice to involve harming
people as knowers but don’t broach the topic of harming people as things known. It also
diverges from the literature on epistemic injustice in general, which as far as we know has not
broached the idea of harm as a thing known. Consider the following passage from Pohlhaus
(2017: 13-14), a passage we think nicely captures the zeitgeist: “Epistemic injustices can
therefore be understood as epistemic in at least three senses. First, they harm particular
knowers as knowers. Second, they cause epistemic dysfunction, for example by distorting
understanding or stymieing inquiry. Third they accomplish the aforementioned two harms
from within, and sometimes through the use of, our epistemic practices and institutions, for
example, when school curricula and academic disciplines are structured in ways that system-
atically ignore, distort, and/or discredit particular intellectual traditions... Consequently, an
epistemic injustice not only harms a knower as a knower, but also is a harm that a knower per-
petrates as a knower and that an epistemic institution causes in its capacity as an epistemic
institution.” Harm as a thing known does not fit into any of these categories.
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Of course, CFI also involves many other harms. For instance, it also involves
harms people as knowers. These people can be third parties (such as medical
doctors treating trans persons) who lack relevant knowledge. They can also
be the would-be objects of knowledge themselves (such as queer persons first
coming to understand their sexualities, who are in the process hindered by
widespread ignorance and misinformation). But they are not always the would-
be objects of knowledge themselves. And when they are third parties, they
may be personally untargeted by the oppression at work (as a doctor might
be). In these latter cases, where the harmed-as-knower parties are personally
untargeted by the oppression at work, is not clear that the relevant harms
are properly classified as epistemic injustices.31 This means that CFI doesn’t
always, or at least doesn’t always clearly, count as an epistemic injustice in
virtue of its involving harm to people or groups as knowers. But it does always
count as an epistemic injustice. This is because it always generates harm via
malignant misrecognition to people or groups as things known.
To be clear, these points apply only to the central cases of CFI (to which
our discussion is restricted), that is to say the cases which perpetuate contexts
of oppression. An instance of malignant misrecognition cannot be identified
in isolation; it must be a part of larger cultural patterns of interpreting and
evaluating information. When it fits into these larger patterns, CFI can be
understood as an epistemic injustice.32
31For relevant discussion see Beeby 2011.
32Thus we reject as a false dichotomy the binary between structural bases of injustice such
as social norms, and psychological bases of injustice such as identity prejudice. The latter is
both psychological (because a mental state) and structural (because, in the ways we argue
below, it functions systematically to underwrite oppression). In rejecting this binary we part
ways with many theorists including Fraser (2008: 86), who writes that “...misrecognition is not
purveyed primarily through prejudice... Rather, it is relayed through institutions and practices
that regulate social interaction according to norms that impede parity”. While prejudice may
not be the primary purveyor of malignant misrecognition, we think (and will argue below)
that it systematically underwrites oppression in the same ways institutions, practices, and
norms do. This shared systematicity undermines the psychological/structural binary.
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3.2 An application: epistemic injustice and white igno-
rance
The connections between CFI and malignant misrecognition illuminate the rela-
tionships between epistemic injustice and the epistemology of ignorance, includ-
ing white ignorance.33 To start showing how, we turn again to Jose´ Medina,
who in his work on white ignorance has suggested that in cases of white ig-
norance where epistemic harm is intimately connected to social injustice, the
people who are directly epistemically harmed are not the victims of injustices.
Medina writes:
The hermeneutical disadvantages inscribed in white ignorance are
not only harmful, but wrongful, although the harm is committed
against someone else: interestingly and crucially, the hermeneutical
harms are wrongful for others, not for those upon whom the epis-
temic harms are directly inflicted... In fact, in white ignorance the
primary [hermeneutical] and secondary [psychological, economic, po-
litical] harms diverge so radically that those who are unable to make
sense of part of their identity and experience–the white subjects–
at the same time enjoy practical benefits and ways to hold on to
their privileges thanks to their hermeneutical disadvantages... The
privileged white subjects’ inability to understand... is part of a pat-
tern of injustice not against them, but against those who suffer the
consequences of white privilege.34
We agree with Medina that what renders white ignorance unjust is not its
epistemic harms to its white subjects. Even though the white subjects expe-
rience misrecognition (they are “unable to make sense of part of their identity
33White ignorance has been characterized in a variety of ways, most influentially by Mills
(2007) as a broad range of types of ignorance rooted in systems of white privilege.
34Medina (2012: 214); emphasis added. Also see Mason (2011).
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and experience”), this misrecognition is not malignant, and in fact reinforces
these subjects’ social privilege. We also agree that white ignorance has caused
downstream harms to those who suffer the consequences of white privilege. But
leaving it at that would suggest that white ignorance is not – or at least is not
clearly – an epistemic injustice. For its status as unjust would appear to be
independent of its direct epistemic harms. Adding malignant misrecognition to
the taxonomy of epistemic injustices, however, allows us to capture why white
ignorance is an epistemic injustice. It is an epistemic injustice because it fea-
tures malignant misrecognition of persons of color: misrecognition that unfairly
diminishes their access to participatory parity.
With these points laid out we can now describe, in more detail, how CFI
relates to the forms of epistemic injustice discussed by Fricker and others.
4 CFI and Its cousins: wires in a cage
Having illustrated CFI with numerous real-life cases, laid down some sufficient
conditions for it, and argued that it constitutes an epistemic injustice, we now
move on to explore its relationships to other forms of epistemic injustice. Since
limits of space preclude us from exploring all such connections, we will focus on
only a few: those to epistemic oppression of the sort discussed by Dotson, and
those to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice of the sort discussed by Fricker
and other theorists.
4.1 CFI and epistemic oppression
In the large literature on epistemic injustice, many authors occasionally use the
term “oppression”. As far as we know, though, only one of those authors takes
it as their central term of criticism. This author is Kristie Dotson, who has the-
orized at length about “epistemic oppression”, a phenomenon she characterizes
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in terms of exclusion:
Epistemic oppression... is primarily characterized by detrimental ex-
clusions from epistemic affairs. Whether concerning hermeneutical
resources or discourse on an important matter of social policy, epis-
temic oppression concerns routine and harmful exclusions from some
domain of knowledge production. All the forms of epistemic injustice
introduced here involve some form of pervasive, harmful epistemic
exclusion. As such, they are all species of epistemic oppression.35
The “species” Dotson references here are (what she calls) first order, second
order, and third order epistemic oppression. To understand them, start with
the notion of “epistemic resources”: items we use to produce knowledge, for
instance concepts or belief-forming mechanisms. Epistemic oppression counts
as first order when it can be ameliorated simply by better utilizing the epis-
temic resources we already possess. For instance, consider the jury’s rejection
of Tom Robinson’s testimony in To Kill A Mockingbird.36 This act of rejection
counts as first order epistemic oppression because, by better utilizing our epis-
temic resource evaluating testimony in unbiased ways, it could be ameliorated.
Epistemic oppression counts as second order when its amelioration requires that
we construct new epistemic resources. Some second order oppression may have
been ameliorated when, for instance, Simone de Beauvoir invented the concept of
gender as distinct from the concept of sex. Finally, epistemic oppression counts
as third order when its amelioration requires that we alter epistemic resources
we already possess. Some third-order oppression might have been ameliorated
when, for instance, Judith Butler successfully urged many theorists to alter the
Beauvoirian concept of sex in such a way that sex is in some sense culturally
35Dotson (2012: 34). Also see Dotson (2014).
36This case has been widely discussed by Fricker (2007) and others.
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constructed.37
Dotson conceives of epistemic oppression as pervasive and harmful exclusion
from epistemic affairs, where this exclusion comes in several forms depending
on what is required for its amelioration. Since CFI is (or so we’ve claimed)
an epistemic injustice on account of its role in systems of oppression (through
malignant misrecognition), it is important to consider how CFI relates to the
phenomena Dotson theorizes. Is CFI a species of Dotsonian epistemic oppres-
sion? Are they freestanding phenomena neither of which subsumes the other
as a species? Are they intertwined in various non-freestanding (perhaps causal)
ways without either being a species of the other?
These issues turn on what counts as “exclusion from epistemic affairs”.
There are two ways in which a person or group might be thus “excluded”.
First, they might be excluded from being subjects of knowledge: from being the
producers and spreaders of knowledge. Second, they might be excluded from be-
ing objects of knowledge: from being involved with the content of the knowledge
produced and spread. A wide conception of epistemic exclusion would subsume
both of these phenomena. A narrow conception of it would subsume only the
first. We aren’t sure whether Dotson’s conception of epistemic exclusion is wide
or narrow in these senses. But we can say this much: on the wide conception
of epistemic exclusion, CFI amounts to a species of Dotsonian epistemic op-
pression. It excludes the oppressed from being objects of knowledge, because it
keeps certain content involving them from playing its proper role in the knowl-
edge economy. On the narrow conception of epistemic exclusion, though, CFI
is not a species of Dotsonian epistemic oppression. This is because it does not,
at least not in and of itself, block or frustrate the oppressed from producing
or spreading knowledge: it frustrates their role, not as knowers, but as things
37Butler (1999: 9-10): “...perhaps this construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed as
gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender...”
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known.
This is not to say that on the narrow conception of epistemic exclusion,
Dotsonian epistemic oppression is unrelated to CFI. On the contrary, the two
phenomena are (on that conception) related in important ways: the same ways
in which CFI, testimonial injustice, and hermeneutical injustice are related. To
these relations we now turn.
4.2 CFI and testimonial injustice
Is CFI a species of testimonial injustice? Already in Fricker’s framework, content
plays a role. Recall Tom Robinson. While the jury rejected Tom’s testimony
that he was innocent, they did not reject all of his testimony. For example, when
he told them that he often helped his alleged victim with house chores, they
believed him without question. We see in this example, then, that prejudicial
rejection of testimony, due to the hearer’s stereotyping of the speaker, does not
typically apply wholesale across contents. Rather, it applies in a more targeted
way.38 Rape testimony is rejected; testimony about chores is not. What happens
here is not exactly that prejudiced hearers don’t believe those speakers. Rather, it
is that prejudiced hearers don’t believe those speakers when they say that thing.
Women aren’t believed when they say they want to prioritize their careers;
disabled persons aren’t believed when they say they have a high quality of life;
black persons aren’t believed when they say they are innocent of crimes.
Indeed, before Fricker, this feature of testimonial injustice was observed by
Patricia Hill Collins, who cites South African businesswoman Danisa Baloyi as
saying, “As a student doing research in the United States, I was amazed by the
[small] amount of information on Black South African women, and shocked that
38Fricker (2007: 131) is explicit on this point. She writes: “...Tom Robinson might have
been relied on and trusted epistemically on certain matters even by the more thoroughly racist
white citizens of Maycomb County - matters relating to his daily work, no doubt, and indeed
many everyday matters of practical import, so long as there was... nothing about the subject
matter that might be seen to imply that this Negro was getting above himself”.
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only a minuscule amount was actually written by Black women themselves.”39
Baloyi here observes a result of CFI – a dearth of information about Black
South African women – as well as a compounding testimonial injustice: Black
South African women’s voices were excluded from this body of information. No
doubt, much of the testimonial injustice was simultaneously CFI: Black South
African women were not trusted as experts on their own lives and experiences
both because of their identities and because of racist and xenophobic prejudices
involving the contents of their would-be contributions.
Although CFI and testimonial injustice often occur simultaneously, we think
there are good reasons to distinguish them from one another. First, testimo-
nial injustice – as described by Fricker – has distinct manifestation conditions
from CFI. In cases of testimonial injustice, prejudice regarding the speaker is
always present. But many cases of CFI don’t feature prejudice regarding the
speaker. Prejudice about the speaker is thus essential to testimonial injustice,
but inessential to CFI. This difference in manifestation conditions gives rise to
a second difference between the CFI and testimonial injustice, namely a differ-
ence in kind among the harms associated with the two phenomena. Whenever a
hearer commits a testimonial injustice against a speaker, the hearer insults that
speaker in particular by impugning that speaker’s identity. This personalized
insult constitutes a harm and, at least in the cases where the identity at issue
is itself subjected to oppression, this personalized insult is an injustice. Such
insults need not be made in cases of CFI, where the speaker’s identity need not
be impugned.
For these reasons, we reserve the phrase “testimonial injustice” for the phe-
nomenon which Fricker points out via that label and which many others have
discussed – that is, the phenomenon occurring when, due to prejudice regarding
a speaker, a hearer rejects that speaker’s testimony. CFI is not a species of
39Hill Collins (1991), 3, citing Baloyi (1995), 41.
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this phenomenon. Nonetheless, CFI and testimonial injustice do not stand free
of one another. Rather, they are importantly related causally, in at least two
ways.
First, testimonial injustice and content-focused injustice can overlap. Sup-
pose a hearer has some prejudice involving the content of some testimony, but
not enough to make them reject that testimony. And suppose the same hearer
also has some prejudice about the identity of the speaker of that very same
testimony, but again not enough to make them reject the testimony. These two
vectors of prejudice might jointly determine the rejection of an item of testi-
mony even though neither of them is strong enough to do the trick on its own.
For example, a Black male speaker might say “women are on average paid less
than men for the same work” to a hearer who harbors some (but not very much)
anti-black prejudice and some (but not very much) anti-woman prejudice. Here,
the two vectors of prejudice might jointly result in the hearer rejecting the tes-
timony, even though neither of them is strong enough to bring about that result
on its own. (And, of course, multiple vectors of prejudice might jointly result
in testimony rejection while each of them is strong enough on its own to do the
trick, so that they “overdetermine” the outcome.)
Second, content-focused injustice and testimonial injustice reinforce one an-
other in the sense that each of them blocks certain paths to the removal of the
other. To illustrate this, consider a scenario in which CFI operates and then
testimonial injustice subsequently operates as well. Suppose, for instance, that
a male worker in an office tells his male boss that women frequently have good
ideas. Further suppose that the boss stereotypes women as being incapable
of having good ideas, and because of this rejects his male worker’s assertion,
thereby committing an act of CFI. Finally, suppose that at a later point, Susan
(another worker in the office) comes to the boss with an idea, and that the boss
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rejects Susan’s idea in an act of testimonial injustice. Now, the following judge-
ment about such a case seems correct: if the boss had believed his male worker,
he would have been more likely to believe Susan as well. After all, the male
worker’s assertion – “Women frequently have good ideas” – challenges the boss’s
anti-woman stereotypes. By accepting such an assertion, the boss would begin,
if only in a small way, to stop stereotyping women as being incapable of having
good ideas. And, should the boss thus begin to stop stereotyping, he would be-
come more likely to accept women’s ideas – such as Susan’s idea. The key point
to notice, though, is that CFI stops this process in its tracks: by prejudicially
rejecting his male worker’s assertion in an act of CFI, the boss stops a process
that would render him less likely to commit future acts of testimonial injustice.
The scenario thus illustrates an important (and we think common) causal in-
teraction between CFI and testimonial injustice. In this causal interaction, CFI
reinforces testimonial injustice by blocking a path to its removal.40
The reinforcement works in the opposite direction as well, with testimonial
injustice reinforcing CFI. To illustrate this, suppose that the acts in our scenario
happen in a different order. Suppose, in particular, that the first thing to
happen is that Susan goes to the boss with an idea which he rejects in an act
of testimonial injustice; and that subsequently, the male worker asserts to the
boss that women frequently have good ideas - and that the boss rejects this
assertion, in an act of CFI. Here, it seems correct to judge that, had the boss
believed Susan’s assertion in the first place, he would have been more likely to
believe his male worker’s assertion later as well. After all, believing a woman’s
assertion renders one more receptive to the thought that women have good ideas
40Young (1990: 65): “The cultural imperialism in which white men make stereotypical
assumptions about... Blacks or women, for example, contributes to the marginalization and
powerlessness many Blacks and women suffer”. The patterns of reinforcement we’ve broached
here begin to fill in the details about how this “contribution” proceeds. As Sonny Kim also
pointed out to us, CFI can lead to the creation of certain identities – e.g., sexist men labeling
another man as a ‘feminist’ – that then result in testimonial injustice.
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(at least if the woman’s assertion later bears fruit in practice). In our newly
rearranged version of the story, then, the boss would have been more inclined
to believe his male worker, had he (earlier on) believed his female worker. The
key point to notice, though, is that testimonial injustice stops this process in
its tracks: by prejudicially rejecting his female worker’s assertion in an act of
testimonial injustice, the boss stops a process that would render him less likely to
commit future acts of CFI. This version of our scenario illustrates the point that
testimonial injustice causally reinforces CFI by blocking paths to its removal.
In sum, CFI and testimonial injustice are mutually reinforcing in the sense
that each of them blocks certain paths to the removal of the other. In this way
they resemble wires in a cage. Try to push a given wire aside, and the other
wires reinforce it; try to push those reinforcing wires aside, and the original
wire reinforces them. Similarly with testimonial injustice and CFI: try to reduce
testimonial injustice by teaching people about oppressed groups, and CFI resists
those efforts; try to reduce this resistant CFI, and testimonial injustice resists
those efforts. In this way testimonial injustice and CFI do not stand free but
instead prop one another up. They are not isolated wrongs, but elements of a
structure or system which can only be seen macroscopically: a birdcage.
4.3 CFI and hermeneutical injustice
Hermeneutical injustice, also connects to CFI in important ways. Hermeneutical
injustice happens when people can’t understand their own experience because,
due to unequal social power relations, they lack the necessary tools (e.g., con-
cepts).41 Such a person, in Fricker’s terminology, is “hermeneutically marginal-
ized”. This form of injustice both causally reinforces, and is causally reinforced
by, CFI; the two forms of injustice also sometimes overlap.
41See e.g. Fricker (2007: 147-161) and Medina (2013).
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In bringing out these causal connections, we follow Fricker in using the con-
cept of ‘sexual harassment’ as our central example. Before the development
and dissemination of this concept, women widely faced a similar set of negative
experiences that they found hard to understand or articulately explain. The
concept of sexual harassment served to delineate these particular experiences,
giving women the ability to understand them and articulately explain them.
The lack of this concept, before its development and dissemination, gave rise to
an important instance of hermeneutical injustice.
Using this example of hermeneutical injustice, we can ask about connections
between CFI and hermeneutical injustice. We propose that CFI is a causal
mechanism that reinforces – or even establishes – hermeneutical injustice. This
can occur in at least two ways. The first concerns the development of a concept.
The development of a concept like “sexual harassment” typically occurs through
persons having a conversation about and realization of their shared experiences.
This process is depicted in a first-person account from Susan Brownmiller’s
memoir of the US women’s liberation movement (cited by Fricker):
We realized that to a person, every one of us...had had an experience
like this at some point, you know? And none of us had ever told
anyone before. It was one of those click, aha! moments, a profound
revelation.... Eight of us were sitting in an office of Human Affairs...
brainstorming about what we were going to write on the posters
for our speak-out... We wanted something that embraced a whole
range of subtle and unsubtle persistent behaviors. Somebody came
up with “harassment.” Sexual harassment! Instantly we agreed.
That’s what it was.42
One way CFI can reinforce hermeneutical injustice is by preventing or de-
42Fricker (2007: 150).
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laying interactions necessary for developing a particular concept. For example,
suppose that male colleagues of women being harassed had gone to administra-
tors to report the mistreatment of their female colleagues, and administrators
dismissed their testimony due to prejudicial views about women (for example,
as being ‘too sensitive’). In such a scenario, CFI would reinforce hermeneutical
injustice: by failing to take men’s reports of harassment seriously, administra-
tors would not facilitate the discussions necessary for developing a concept of
sexual harassment.
A second way that CFI can reinforce hermeneutical injustice concerns ac-
cess to already-developed concepts. In the previous example, hermeneutical
injustice arose because the concept of sexual harassment had not yet been de-
veloped. But hermeneutical injustice can occur even when a relevant concept
exists. So long as someone does not have access to the needed concept, they
will be unable to fully understand or articulate their experience. Lauren Zuniga
illustrates hermeneutical injustice in her poem “Confessions of an Uneducated
Queer”. There, she writes, “This is for the first time I ever heard the term
‘heteronormative’ and felt like I was handed a corkscrew after years of open-
ing the bottle with my teeth.”43 Zuniga here describes the profound effect of
gaining, with a term and concept, the ability to understand her experience of
heteronormativity. Yet the hermeneutical injustice she suffered was due, not to
the non-existence of a concept of heteronormativity, but rather to Zuniga’s lack
of access to this concept.
CFI can result in someone’s being cut off from or delayed from accessing con-
cepts required to understand significant experiences. To see how, it is important
to first notice that access to concepts is cut off or delayed when concepts do not
have uptake: that is, when they are not taken seriously, adopted, or spread
within one’s community. Failure of uptake is sometimes due to CFI: a concept
43Zuniga (2012).
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needed to describe a marginalized group’s experience is developed, but those
outside of the group reject or ignore testimony deploying that concept due to
their prejudice, effectively preventing the spread of this concept.44 One example
of this phenomenon comes from right-wing TV personality Bill O’Reilly. When
O’Reilly received reports that many Harvard students were upset by the het-
eronormative remarks of a visiting speaker, he began a segment on the event as
follows:
Another controversy at Harvard, this one over something called “het-
eronormative” remarks made by actress Jada Pinkett Smith... We’ll
define heteronormative in a moment. I can hardly say it. But, ap-
parently Ms. Smith received an award from Harvard and then told
the crowd that women in America can have it all, a good career,
family, devoted husband, things like that. According to the Harvard
“Crimson” newspaper, some gays objected to Ms. Smith’s remarks
because they were directed at heterosexuals exclusively, thus [mo-
tioning scare-quotes] “heteronormative”.45
In this monologue, O’Reilly mocks the concept of heteronormativity. More-
over, he seemingly does so because he associates this concept with gay persons
and harbors prejudice against this group. In mocking the concept, O’Reilly
effectively characterizes it as an absurdity that his listeners should not employ
or take seriously. Given the predictable result that his listeners then do not
deploy this concept, it is more likely that persons in their social circles fail to
be exposed to this concept. The ensuing conceptual lacuna creates hermeneu-
tical injustice. O’Reilly’s act of CFI blocks a path by which people might gain
access to the concept of heteronormativity. In this way, CFI causally reinforces
44This is one of the themes of Pohlhaus (2012) and Medina (2013).
45See “Were Jada Pinkett Smith’s Recent Comments at Harvard Too ‘Heteronormative’?”
Fox News, March 9, 2005.
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hermeneutical injustice.46
Plausibly, the reinforcement runs in the other direction too, with hermeneu-
tical injustice causally reinforcing CFI. Rather than illustrate this point, though,
we will move on to a new one. In particular, we move on to the point that these
two forms of injustice can causally overlap. To see how this might happen, sup-
pose that hermeneutical injustice makes it difficult to articulately describe the
experience of interacting with police while being a black person in contemporary
America. Such a supposition would be true if, as is wholly possible, we have
not yet zeroed in on concepts adequate to the experience in question, concepts
standing to that experience as the concept of heteronormativity stood to Lauren
Zuniga’s experience. Further suppose that a white person tries to explain to
another white person the experience black persons face when interacting with
police. In this case, the speaker may only be able to describe the relevant expe-
rience inarticulately. Now suppose that, in a certain case, this inarticulateness
is not quite enough on its own to keep the hearer from believing the speaker.
In such a case, if the hearer also harbors prejudice against black persons, this
prejudice might, in combination with the relevant inarticulateness, bring the
hearer to reject the speaker’s testimony. In such a case, which seems possible
to us, hermeneutical injustice and CFI causally overlap; they jointly determine
an unjust rejection of testimony (and, of course, similar cases might feature
overdetermination).
Testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, and content-focused injustice
form a network of mutually reinforcing injustices. They block paths to the
removal of one another and also causally overlap. And so it happens that even
when particular acts of the relevant sorts seem like minor inconveniences in
46Another case: during a rally for his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump “made
thinly veiled jokes about the lack of sexual attractiveness of the female protesters and the
lack of hetero-normative manliness of the males” (Kurtz 2016). Here again, preemptive CFI
occurs when a speaker mocks the concept of heteronormativity.
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and of themselves, those acts jointly constitute a harmful structure which is
profound, pervasive, and resilient. They constitute a birdcage.47
5 Conclusion
There is a rich and complicated network of epistemic (and social and politi-
cal) injustices, a network featuring many different phenomena that interact in
mutually reinforcing ways. While some of these phenomena feature prejudice
against the speaker who makes an assertion, others feature prejudice involving
the content of the assertion a speaker makes. Our aim here has been to bring
the latter kinds of epistemic injustice to light, theorizing about their nature and
their relationships to other kinds of epistemic injustice.
For the sake of simplicity we’ve restricted our analysis to only two kinds of
actions: rejections of assertions and preemptions of assertions. Further work
on CFI might proceed by removing various aspects of this simplification. For
instance, CFI can no doubt occur when a person ignores, accepts, makes, or en-
courages assertions at least in part because of prejudice involving their content.
Similarly, it can no doubt occur when a speaker, recognizing that a hearer’s
prejudice involving an assertion’s content will keep that hearer from accepting
that assertion, refrains from making that assertion.48 Other instances of CFI
might happen when people reject (and preempt and so on), not assertions, but
other speech acts such as questions. Presumably, instances of CFI can involve
any speech act. For that matter, they can presumably involve things other than
47To see some of the further wires in the cage, think about cases where someone is taken to
be authoritative about a marginalized group precisely because they do not belong to it (e.g.,
heterosexuals about LGBTQ persons, men about women). Such authority often is fragile,
and depends in particular on the non-member’s claims aligning with dominant, prejudiced
beliefs about that group. That is, credibility excess does often attach to people because of
their identity, but in many cases, it is contingent on the content of their claims matching up
with prejudiced views about the groups being reported-on; the credibility excesses at issue
can be lost when the reporter contradicts or questions these prejudicial views. In this type of
scenario, again, we see that testimonial injustice and CFI work in tandem.
48Compare “testimonial smothering” from Dotson (2011).
31
speech acts. For instance, people might prejudicially interpret or ignore or reject
concepts or physical evidence or as-yet-unasserted theories.49 Moreover, we see
no reason to believe that prejudice must be involved in every case of CFI. While
prejudice does function systematically (in the ways we have tried to illuminate)
to lead to malignant misrecognition and (thereby) epistemic injustice, there is no
reason to think it is required for this systematic functioning. CFI without prej-
udice is a live possibility; similarly for CFI without assertion and CFI without
speech acts. These further varieties of CFI, far from undermining our analysis,
show how that analysis fruitfully suggests new directions for further research, in
particular research attempting to remove our initial simplifications by exploring
the ways in which the many forms of CFI relate to each other, to other forms
of epistemic injustice, and to systematic socio-political oppression.50
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